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TIME-VALUE AUCTION  
ABSTRACT 
A system and method are disclosed to allow users to make a micropayment to skip 
remaining ads in a commercial break of online media. The system shows video content with 
an option to skip the ads shown on a small button or other user interface (UI) element 
overlaid on the video. The method calculates the ad cost using simple or multi-video 
auctions. It also creates incentives for advertisers to improve ads by increasing cost-per-
impression of ads that users may dislike. The system also includes a mechanism to provide 
feedback to the advertiser regarding quality score of the ads and uses machine learning to 
optimize various aspects of the commercial break. Thus, the system creates both economic 
incentives and feedback for advertisers to improve the quality of their ads while improving 
user experience. 
BACKGROUND 
Online ad-supported video-on-demand services inject commercial breaks into video 
content served online.  The ads may be injected either at predefined points during a streaming 
television show, or pre-rolled before videos that tend to be shorter. Users may dislike  
commercial breaks inserted into online video content. At the same time, they may not be 
willing to pay an upfront fee (however small) to download  ad-free video contents. On the 
flip side, advertisers have no feedback on a user’s perception of their ads, and no financial 
incentive to make the ads more appealing. Thus there is a need for a better method to 
optimize users’ dislike of ads while allowing more revenue options for content owners. 
DESCRIPTION 
This disclosure presents a system and a method to provide users with the ability to 
make a micro-payment, at any moment, to skip the remainder of the ads in the commercial 
break of online media and to immediately resume the video content.  The system depicted in 
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FIG. 1 shows video content with an option to skip the ads shown on a small button (or other 
user interface (UI) element) overlaid on the video, indicating the price to skip the commercial 
break. The method calculates the ad cost and creates incentives for advertisers by increasing 
cost-per-impression of annoying ads in an auction. A feedback mechanism in the ad-creation 
UI provides feedback to the advertiser regarding quality score of the ads. 
 
FIG. 1: System to skip ads 
Using the method, cost per impression of the remaining video is calculated by running 
individual auctions for each ad impression. The price of skipping back to the show is 
calculated in an auction, using the sum of the cost-per-impression of all remaining video 
advertisements to be shown during that commercial break. If the user wants to skip all the 
advertisements, he must pay the cost of all the advertisements. The cost could keep 
decreasing as the break progresses. In this way, users are paying the exact amount for the 
skipped ad impressions that may have been delivered, to the content owner.  
Another way to calculate cost per impression is using a multi-video auction that 
maximizes the expected value of the entire commercial break by taking into account the 
sequence of ads shown, and other features. The method allows advertisers to increase the cost 
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of skipping ads. Thus, the system creates incentives for advertisers to make less annoying ads 
by causing the cost-per-impression of annoying ads to increase to the amount users are 
willing to pay to skip the ads based on their perception of value of their time and the ad's 
impact on them.  
This method is illustrated by an example. An advertiser creates and runs an incredibly 
annoying ad. Users pay to skip this ad in large numbers, such that the ad is able to deliver 
very few impressions. The advertiser increases the cost-per-impression bid in an attempt to 
get more delivery for their ad. Users must now pay more to skip the remainder of the 
commercial break when their ad is included. Eventually, through a feedback mechanism the 
advertiser gets feedback that the videos have a low quality score based on the fact that users 
are paying to skip the ad. This creates an incentive for the advertiser to make their ad less 
annoying to lower the cost per impression bid needed to reach a larger number of users. This 
type of system thus generates important feedback for the ad delivery system.  
The system disclosed uses machine learning to optimize various aspects of the 
commercial break based on the number of ads, time duration of the ads, and the order of the 
ads with the goal of maximizing the expected value of the entire commercial break. In the 
analysis, data on which commercial break sessions are skipped, and the price users are 
willing to pay to skip each ads, act as a negative inputs that can be tuned to maximize 
revenue while minimizing user annoyance. In common online games, users may not be 
willing to make an upfront payment, but may pay smaller amounts over time to make 
progress or to save time. Users who have not paid for an ad-free video may pay to skip ads at 
certain times. Therefore, the system may be helpful in creating a habit of paying for video 
content. 
4
Toksoz and Price: Time-Value Auction
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2017
Thus the system creates both economic incentives and feedback for advertisers to 
improve the quality of their ads. This mechanism can monetize long-form content on online 
media, in a way that gives users ultimate control over the advertising.  
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